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Abstract:  Media has a crucial  and dominant role to supply political information for citizens in
democratic societies. Press freedom is a key component to evaluate the level of democracy and
there is a positive correlation between democracy and press freedom (Karlekar & Becker, 2014). On
our research, we look into the changes within the structure of media during the years between 2002
and 2015. By focusing on Twitter users’ activities throughout the Turkish General Election of 2015,
political activities are analyzed. Under violations of press freedom in Turkey, this study aims to find
out which media outlets are preferred –mainstream and non-mainstream ones–, by Twitter users, for
providing the political and social information to support their ideas. Our results show that there is a
correlation  between  the  users’ ideologies  and  their  media  outlet  preferences.  The  ones  who
sympathize the ruling party share the national mainstream media outlets’ links whereas the ones
who sympathize the opposing parties’ share the international mainstream media outlets’ links.
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1. The Relationship between the Media and Democracy
The definition of democracy we use in this article is inspired by Robert Dahl’s (2000) book called
“On Democracy”. Dahl focuses on political equality in which equal rights and opportunities for
everyone is given by the government. In Dahl’s definition of democracy, one needs freedom of
expression and access to alternative information sources to have that political equality (McLaren,
2008; Keyman & Gumuscu, 2014). This is where we witness the relationship between the media
and democracy. From the very early stages of democracy and its practices in history, the political
philosophers always prioritized and based democracy on the key concepts such as the freedom of
expression and the right to freely discuss a public matter with others (Keane, 1991). All different
thoughts,  perspectives  and  ideas  need  to  take  part  in  media  so  that  the  politicians’ political
domination and influence on people would be restricted and the civil society structure would be in
progress (Voltmer, 2005). As a democratic entity, media’s another duty is to inspect and follow the
politicians and political organizations. Media can act as ‘the fourth force” or “ monitor” that, if
needed, can even publicly announce the ruling party manipulative, insincere or even guilty based on
their observations and investigations throughout the party’s political actions and statements (Kelley
& Donway, 1990; Curran, 2011). The term ‘the fourth force” stems back to the 19th Century in
which  it  came  about  in  relation  to  checks  and  balances,  the  three  branches  of  the  federal
government; Executive, Legislative and Judicial. Media might run into challenging situations while
trying  to  be  the  fourth  force.  The  media  themselves  are  often  unable  to  survive  without  state
subsidies, which might severely impair their ability to criticize political power holders (Voltmer,
2005: 4). 
Aside from this, a lot of big media organizations in Turkey are owned by various holdings whose
main profits are made in different sectors, not related to media at all. These holdings’ unexplainable
and  unpredictable  relationships  based  on  mutual  interests  -with  the  ruling  government-  causes
media to apply these core media duties mentioned above.  Media has also the power to inform or
manipulate people in our current democratic societies. James S. Fishkin defines manipulation as
such:
A person  has  been  manipulated  by  a  communication  when she  has  been  exposed  to  a
message intended to change her views in a way she would not accept if she were to think
about it on the basis of good conditions —and in fact she does change her views in the
manner that was intended (Fishkin, 2011: 33).
In our current age, one can have easy access to numerous kinds of sources to get information. The
rise in reaching out to tons of sources today, increased the ways to find new techniques to express or
shape up an idea in media (Le  Cheminant & Parrish, 2011). By being aware of the power and
impact that media have on people, the ruling parties are more likely to apply these techniques in
media so that people would continue to support the ruling parties (Van Belle, 1997).
2. The Media Structure in Turkey
There is a correlation between the changes in media structure and the political changes in Turkey. In
the first years of the Turkish Republic, the journalists with opposite views –against the system of
the government– were put on trial in the special Independent Courts1 (Sözeri & Kurban, 2014: 192).
Media censorship were active during the 1950s one ruling party regime and also the Democrat Party
(DP) government (Bek, 2004). Throughout the three main coup d'états in Turkey, the censorship
was also observed.
1Independent Courts were established in September 18, 1920 to stand those who are accused of spying, revolting, 
looting and following anti-independence propagandas against Turkey on trial.
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Media  outlets  were  mostly  owned  and  run  by  either  rooted,  respected  families  or  political
organizations. In 1980s, this ownership status was shifted to the big companies which had huge
investments in different sectors. Former Prime Minister Turgut Özal’s new neoliberal economical
reform played a big role in this change. The ideological differences had become less effective in this
era. Companies acted only to maintain their business relationships with the ruling party so that they
preserved and protected their current privileges given by the government. Thus, instead of being a
powerful actor in politics, media turned into nothing but a tool that was used by the ruling party and
the private equity. Erol Simavi, a media mogul, who owned one of the most respected newspapers
in Turkey Hürriyet defines media as such: “The main power source in Turkey is not the Military. It
is  the  media.  Without  media’s  role  and  efforts  nothing  can  be  planned.  Even  the  military
interventions…” (Demir, 2007: 260). 
In 1990s, Turkish Media blossomed into the birth of numerous private radio and TV channels. This
increased the role and impact of Media in politics. It gave rise to the development of “clientelism”2
relationships between media patrons and the state (Christensen, 2007: 185). To be able to see the
impact of the private radio and TV channels, it would be crucial to look into the data of TV ratings
and print circulation. The data shows that 60% of people did not read newspapers while 90% of
people did watch TV. With five hours of daily viewing, Turkey has one of the largest television
audiences in the world (Terzis, 2007: 13). Another factor that increased the effect of this is about the
fact that despite their competition in the media sector, most of these media patrons cooperated or
worked  together  to  protect  their  mutual  interests.  Although  there  are  laws  about  the  media
inspection in Turkey, media markets lack overarching cross-ownership rules (Bayazit, 2016: 387).
This way, the media market went through the direction in which only few companies would be the
main  actors  in  the  sector.  To  increase  its  inspection  and control  over  the  media  companies,  a
government agency Supreme Council of Radio and Television (RTÜK) was established in May 16,
1994. This agency had the aim of  regularly sanctioning broadcast media for violating a very broad
range of regulations  (McLaren, 2008: 14). The best example that shows how media affected and
was affected happened in the February 28 Process. The mainstream media, prompted by Turkey’s
Military,  published  fictitious  content  on  the  rise  of  Islamism during  the  late  1990s (Sözeri  &
Kurban, 2014: 195). The media’s content published during these days played a major role in the
military's soft intervention decision towards the ruling party. 
AKP realized how media can affect people and politics landscape and changed the whole media
outlets –in favor of them– that were owned by the supporters of the Military and secular elites.
Media owners coming from different sectors have a lot to do with this shift. Via the major support
of AKP, the Anatolian Islam Bourgeoisie members started buying these media companies. Their
motivation was to gain power against the elite and also support AKP which they believe defends
their identity and rights as Islamists (Lagendijk, 2012).  AKP won the 2011 general election and
dominated the political arena. This fact made it really hard for the big media moguls or groups to
balance everything among the Military, the ruling party, and the opposition.
Since than,  AKP has developed its own media by using administrative and legal power against
critical  media  groups  and  journalists  (Fuller,  2013;  Gürcan  & Peker,  2015;  Yardımcı-Geyikçi,
2014). This caused a double-edged situation. Media started to have self-censorship and stopped
having anti-government content (Tufekci, 2014). The Gezi Park Protests are the best manifest to
that. These massive protests across the country have been widely ignored by the mainstream media.
CNN Türk ran a penguin documentary while CNN International was broadcasting the event live on
Taksim  Square.  Social  media  became  the  source  for  up-to-date  information  (Bergfeld,  2014;
Kasper, 2014; Koese, 2014). Also, this era is the beginning of evolvement of the ruling party’s
intolerant manner against any kind of criticization  (Taşkin, 2013). Actually, AKP is not the first
2 Clientelism is a social order that depends on various forms of generous subsidies given by the government to 
businesspeople and the media control that government takes over the content.
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party that had an intolerant manner against any kind of criticization about them in Turkey. There is a
tradition in Turkey in which the state tends to silence opposition whenever it is perceived as being
necessary and power is even wielded against citizens who are critical of state institutions (Alemdar,
2015: 432).  However, this manner seems to contradict with the AKP Party Declaration that was
written by the founders and other members of it. This intolerance manner revealed itself more via
the practice of accreditation, namely the restriction of access to official press meetings to select
media (Sözeri & Kurban, 2014: 194).
Figure 1. The Freedom Ranking between 2002 and 2015
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Fuente: The Grey dash line shows the national election years. 
FH-I index has been published since 2009
The data of FreedominWorld (FH-W), FreedominPress (FH-P), FreedomontheNet (FH-I) that were
published  by  Freedom  House  (FH)  between  2002  and  2015  and  the  index  data  of
WorldPressFreedom that was published by Reporters Without Borders (RWB) between 2002 and
2015 can be all seen in Fig 1. The data was calculated based on the average of the changes seen
between 2010 and 2012, because no data was found in 2011. To make sure the data is relative in
RWB, the change between the country listed last and the ranking of the country was prioritized. The
data given as in numbers from 1 to 7 in FH-W, has been converted into the system of 100. This
conversion is made as 100 means best and 0 worst. FH-I and FH-P data show a decrease since 2009.
But, a constant decrease, in the FH-W index is observed after 2012. This statistic proves that it was
right to take 2011 as the year of the change. Also, RWB index remained in the same level –no
change– between 2011 and 2014.
3. Methodology
3.1. Data Collection
The election times are always the periods in which the social and political events take up more
space in individuals lives. Due to this fact, the data collection was intended to be made for the
election happening on July 7th 2015. The data collection period was applied between May 8 and
July 8. During this process, the tweets that were publicly accessible and contained the party slogan,
party’s name or the party leader’s name were collected. Also, the hashtags that contain any data
about the party’s new campaigns were also added to this data collection. Stream API, one of the
data collection methods provided by the Twitter for researchers, was selected to collect tweets that
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contain wanted hashtags. The hashtags that were found during this collection process can be seen in
the supplementary section.
3.2. Research Method
Cascade is  a  term  used  for  a  phenomenal  or  extraordinary  situations.  Usually  described  as
‘InformationCascade’, it can be seen in fashion/ fads, voting for popular candidates, and the spread
of a technological choice as it can be the explanation in many types of imitation in social settings
(Easley & Kleinberg, 2010).  The cascade model we follow during this research will be based on
sharing links which have the retweet and mention activities. A cascade that has lo  and ln  and
n  number  of  steps  is  formulated  as  C={l0 ,l1 } , {l1 , l2 } , {l2 , l3 } , …, {ln −1, ln } .  The  list  that  is
gained  via  this  formula,  provides  us  to  main  cascade-related  features.  One  of  them  is  the
CascadeSize and the other one is  CascadeLife. Cascade size Cd , equals the total number links
ln ;
Cd=∑
l∈C
ln
Cascade Life C s , is formulated as in an ordered list of 
¿
¿
t
(1 ,t 2 ,… ,t n )
C=¿
 that shows t1  as the
time gap between two  sharing link actions. Cascade Life also equals the total time gap between
t1  and t n ;
C s=∑
t∈C
tn
Cascade can break in some conditions. If time, that is in between two sharing link actions, is equal
or bigger than 86,400 seconds ( t ≥ one day ), then cascade breaks3. After forming cascade via the
links of the data set, the links get classified based on the media outlets. The method on Table 1 was
used for this purpose.
Table 1. Media Outlets' Categorization
in out
alternative National small news media International small news media
mainstream National large mass news media International large mass news media
Fuente: Media outlets are categorized as alternative-mainstream 
and in-out, based on their features
The main factors to form these groups were based on the answers for questions such as
- Which media organization does this media outlet belong to? 
- What is their target audience? 
- What is their target region? 
Four different individuals made these categorizations and the ones that have more than 50% results
were identified. During this process, the platforms such as  Twitter,  YouTube and  Facebook were
3 It ’s technically possible to tweet, retweet or mention a message that was shared a long time ago.  If this time 
difference is ignored, then cascade’s life can be too long (extended a lot). Thus, this difference may cause a negative 
effect and result in this study.
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categorized under the social media title whereas the other social media links were grouped under
Others category.
4. Result
The daily tweet volume collected based on our formula can be seen on Figure 2-Panel A. After
looking into the daily tweet volume, primarily it was observed that the twitter users show great
interest in political parties’ election campaigns. A significant increase in the daily tweet volume was
also seen especially in the beginning period of these election campaigns run by these parties. The
AKP election  slogan  (Others  only  preach  while  AKP puts  it  into  practice)  became  the  main
triggering effect that made AKP have a significant amount of increase between May 8 and 10.
Similarly, the increase in CHP’s daily tweet volume between May 20 and 23, 2015 is related to the
popularity of their slogan (For a Prosperous Turkey). Also, as indicated in Figure 2-Panel A, the
increase in the daily tweet volumes can affect the election campaigns differently. The fluctuation on
AKP’s daily tweet volume, on May 31st, has been observed because it has fallen on the second
anniversary of the Gezi Park Protest. Hashtags such as “gezi2yaşında” (Gezi is 2 years old), “Ali
İsmail Korkmaz”1, “Geziyi Unutma” (Never Forget Gezi) and “Geziyi Hatırla” (Remember Gezi)
have formed these peaks. Similarly, the fluctuation on HDP’s daily tweet volume, on June 5th, was
observed because of an explosion occurred during a HDP meeting in the city of Diyarbakır. Such
fluctuations  seen  on  these  daily  tweet  volumes,  prove  that  they  can  easily  get  influenced  by
sensational events.
The  daily  tweet  volume  was  calculated  by  subsetting  the  data  that  was  on  Figure  2-Panel  B,
containing at least one link. The data set had a significant amount of decrease in Panel B. The
volumes of each parties’ data sets seem to be in similar amounts. The increase in Panel A’s daily
tweet volume was also observed in Panel B. Per the activities in the HDP’s daily tweet volume on
June 5, the link shares in the panel increased a lot. 
Figure 2. Data of the Daily Tweet Volumes collected between May 8 and July 8, 2015
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Fuente: The daily tweet volume based on hashtags gathered during the data collection process 
can be seen in Panel A. The daily tweet volume containing one link can be found in Panel B.
The change based on the link shares in the daily tweet volume is shown in Table 2, in details. Part
A, contains the data gathered during the data collection process whereas; Part B, contains the data
that only has links. When compared the total tweet volume in both parts, AKP’s 9.46% of the data
contains links. Other parties have similar amounts of links in their volumes. CHP and HDP have the
highest amount of link shares, 30% of unique users have at least one link shares. When looked into
the ratio of the total unique user number to the unique user number who shares a link; CHP has the
highest number (37.20%) while AKP has the lowest (31.95%). The same outcome applied when it
came to the Retweet rates. 
Table 2. The general data set (A), the data set containing a link (B) and the difference (%) in the
data set’s volume, user and retweet amounts.
Total Tweet Volume Unique User RT Number
A B % A B % A B %
AKP 672,907 63,702 9.46 76,557 24,464 31.95 234,536 23,586 10.05
CHP 249,651 71,693 28.71 77,429 28,809 37.20 180,413 48,363 26.80
MHP 283,102 60,685 21.43 79,527 27,769 34.91 217,901 44,754 20.53
HDP 373,300 103,439 27.70 114,160 41,921 36.72 249,724 68,198 27.30
The main difference between the two data sets showed us that there is no need for any extra element
to support the AKP users’ perspectives. Meanwhile, similar behavior patterns were observed among
the other parties’ users.
Each parties’ cascade life and size can be seen in Figure 3. To analyze the process well, cascade life
calculation was made in “seconds”.  Each data’s cascade life that falls on each time period was
calculated by using log transformation. HDP has the highest number for each cascade’s life and has
the  lowest  mean  (4.26)  of  cascade  life.  Based on each  cascade  life  numbers,  CHP has  higher
number than MHP and AKP. The users that have HDP hashtags have more link shares. Although
AKP has the lowest number for each cascade life, it has a significant peak around 4. In addition to
this, cascade life directly affects the visibility of links in the network. Because of this idea, HDP and
CHP link sharing activities are more effective than any other parties’.
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Cascade size for each party can be found in Panel B. As mentioned before, cascade size shows how
many users prefer to share the same link in the network. This action shows the power of the link,
which strengthens a party’s ideological argument. Panel B also shows the sizes of these chains
formed by users. The cascade that HDP users formed is the longest. CHP has the second longest one
whereas MHP and AKP are shorter and they both have significant amount of outliners. CHP and
HDP have the highest median and their max values are also the highest among the parties. AKP has
some high numbers in cascade size and it shows that some links are getting more attention from
users. Besides this, the median of cascade size has the lowest value among all parties. CHP and
HDP cascades are more impactful than other parties.  
Figure 3. Cascade Life and Size for each party
Fuente: Log Transformation is applied so that cascade related activities would be more accurate
Figure 4 shows the alternative and mainstream cascades  formed by the links  of media outlets.
Media outlets are categorized as alternative and mainstream and each section contains in-s and out-
s. Figure 5-Panel A, shows the cascade life and size distribution rates based on alternative media
outlets’ in and out definition. The users that share links through AKP hashtags prefer alternative in
media outlets.  Although the ones  who share links  through HDP and CHP hashtags  also prefer
alternative  in media links, the alternative  out media links form a longer cascade life and size for
CHP and HDP.
Panel  B shows the cascade life  and size distribution rates  based on mainstream media  outlets.
Mainstream media outlets have a balanced distribution compared to the alternative media outlets’.
HDP users have more out media outlets and these links have more cascade life and size. AKP users
have the least in out media outlets. Regarding the alternative and mainstream media outlets, the in
media outlets are the most popular source one among the AKP users. The situation is no different
for other parties. HDP is the only one that uses the highest amount of alternative and mainstream
out media  resources.  The  main  reason  for  this  is  about  the  presence  of  news  pieces  that  are
politically and ideologically parallel to theirs. The density that CHP users have in mainstream out
ones, is related to the fact that there are not many news pieces present in mainstream in resources,
which are parallel to CHP users’ ideology and political view. 
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Figure 4. The in-out distribution of cascade based on alternative (A) 
and mainstream (B) according to cascade size and life
The distribution of cascade size and life, based on the alternative and mainstream media outlets,
exposes a lot about the user preferences. Table 3 exhibits the total of cascades in this distribution.
The number of links within the  in media category is the highest, regarding the alternative media
preferences. When we look into the ratio between the alternative  out media number and the total
alternative media number, HDP is the one that has the highest rate with 15.87%. AKP has the lowest
number, 0.79%. Similarly, the number is also high for the in number within the mainstream media
outlets. When we observe the ratio between the number of mainstream media out and number of the
total mainstream media, HDP with 48.6% has the highest and AKP with 20.98% has the lowest
percentages.   Although there  is  a  big  difference  between the  media  in cascade  and media  out
cascade numbers, the values of cascade size and life have always been determinant in this analysis.
When we look into Figure 4 Panel B, regarding the mainstream media outlets, out links of CHP and
MHP –despite them being outnumbered by others– have the highest values of cascade size and life.
It’s crucial to note that the diffusion feature, which allows the links to be visible for the users, is
dependent on these values mentioned above. 
Table 3. The cascade numbers, based on each parties’ media categories
Party Alternative MainstreamIn Out In Out
AKP 375 3 64 17
CHP 725 42 249 126
MHP 639 40 151 78
HDP 1638 309 423 400
The plot made by the media outlets tell us a lot about the users’ media preferences. Table 4 shows
top three links for each party based on the highest cascade life and size value.  Alternative and
mainstream outlets have similarities as well. It is interesting that an alternative media outlet called
asikurtlar.com has a cascade on both AKP and MHP. This fact shows that the users who use both
parties’ hashtags unite under one platform (almost act  alike).  AKP users express themselves on
parties’ official website  akparti.org.tr and also sozlesme2023.com, the one that is formed only for
AKP users during the election process. Similarly, MHP users have shared the official MHP website
bizimleyuruturkiye.com that  has the same name as  their  party slogan.  Users  have preferred the
mainstream in outlets that have had same ideological and political view as theirs. AKP users have
preferred mainstream in media outlets that have close relation with AKP and government such as
yeniakit.com.tr and  aksam.com.tr. And  AnadoluAjansı (aa.com.tr) is a government news agency.
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CHP and  HDP users  have  preferred  to  share  links  that  belong  to  the  ruling  party-opposing
mainstream in media outlets.
In the mainstream out category, bbc.com and aljazeera.com have been the most popular platforms
that have been used as references by all parties except AKP. In addition to these outlets, a Russian
based platform called sputniknews.com has also been popular in the out category. This shows that
users did benefit using platforms from different parts of the world to support their ideas and views.
Table 4. The distribution rates of the highest cascade life and size for both 
alternative and mainstream media outlets
Alternative Mainstream
In Out In Out
AKP
asikurtlar.com commentarymagazine.com yeniakit.com.tr tr.sputniknews.com
sozlesme2023.com nu.nl aa.com.tr spiegel.de
akparti.org.tr mashable.com aksam.com.tr *
CHP
sosyalfarkinda.net kurdishquestion.com sozcu.com.tr bbc.com
halkizbiz.com thesocialhumanist.com bugun.com.tr aljazeera.com
gazetekritik.com anatolikotera.wordpress.com hurriyetdailynews.com tr.sputniknews.com
MHP
bizimleyuruturkiye.com newgokturk.com zaman.com.tr bbc.com
asikurtlar.com ibtimes.co.uk samanyoluhaber.com aljazeera.com
gazete2023.com comunicacion.e-noticies.es bugun.com.tr welt.de
HDP
medyapusula.com armenianweekly.com hurriyetdailynews.com aljazeera.com
birgun.net clarionproject.org t24.com.tr cnn.com
kinghaber.net mosaik-blog.at cumhuriyet.com.tr bbc.com
*AKP mainstream out links have only two platforms, no third one.   
5. Discussion
Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, ‘center vs periphery’44 fight has always
played an active role in the Turkish social and political structure. As the establishment took place,
the secular elites were in the center and they were challenged to leave the center by various political
parties in different terms.
Unlike the previous like-minded parties such as Welfare Party (RP), Happiness Party (SP) and Great
Unity Party (BBP); AKP defined itself as a party that carries mission beyond a “religious party”.The
AKP instead  emphasizes  a  political  style  that  rejects  making  one's  religious  beliefs,  sect,  or
ethnicity the center of the party's platform (Akdoğan, 2006: 54).  But, the polarization level in the
country increased immensely after the 2011 election hegemony. Per the shift of AKP moving into
the Center –used to represent the ones in the periphery– the fight between the Secular Elites and the
Religious took a back seat. At this point, it is inevitable for this multi-part structure to go through a
separation. Another factor that helped AKP shift into the center role is about media. Media, are
effective  and  powerful  ideological  institutions  that  carry  out  a  system-supportive  propaganda
function by reliance on market forces, internalized assumptions and self-censorship, and without
significant overt  coercion (Herman & Chomsky, 2002: 306). The Islamic Bourgeoisie and AKP
during their presence in the periphery, realized this fact about the power of media and then aimed to
own  many  media  outlets.  However,  the  current  legal  sanctions,  inspections  and  the  elaborate
clientelism relationshipwith the ruling party; helped the ruling party gain more control over the
people. Turkish media markets are dominated by a handful of vertically integrated conglomerates
with cross-ownership in  almost  every segment,  supported by influential  religious  sects(Bayazit,
2016: 414). Especially the insufficient performance that media had during the Gezi Park Protests,
caused the  public  to  lose faith  in  media  outlets.  Then,  the  anti-AKP people  started  to  use  the
4The term “Center vs Periphery” was created by Serif Mardin in the Turkish Politics and then was recognized and used 
by many other academicians.
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alternative media outlets  instead of the mainstream ones.  The local  resources in the alternative
media gained more interest during this process. There is a relation between the users’ political and
ideological approaches and the in or out status of media outlets. AKP users prefer the mainstream in
media outlets whereas the other parties’ users prefer the mainstream out media outlets. This shows
that the current media structure does not provide the users information that criticize or oppose the
ruling party. It is also projected that the number of  those who oppose the ruling party will prefer the
alternative in and mainstream out platforms will increase –if this current structure is kept. Despite
the  limited  scope of  this  study –focuses  on the  June  7th 2015 general  election  and its  Twitter
activity during this election– this paper aims to tangibly explain how users react the current political
landscape affecting the media outlets’ behaviors.
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Supplements:
Table 5. The hashtags used during the data collection process, for each party
akparti onlar konuşur akparti yapar ikinci yarı başlıyor başbakan davutoğlu millet geliyor
Justice and 
Development 
Party
Others only preach while 
AKP puts it into practice Second half begins Prime Minister Davutoğlu All for people
chp yüzyılın projesi yaşanacak bir Türkiye kılıçdaroğlu oy ver gitsinler
Republican 
People's Party The Project of the Century
For a Prosperous 
Turkey The leader’s last name
To get rid of them, Vote for 
us
mhp bizimle yürü Türkiye mhp geliyor devlet bahçeli oyum mhp’ye çünkü
Nationalist 
Movement 
Party
Walk with us Turkey MHP is coming The name of party leader I will vote for MHP because…
hdp demirtaş bizler meclise seni başkan yaptırmayacağız bizler hdp
People’s 
Democratic 
Party
The last name of party’s 
male co-chair
Headed to the 
parliament
We won’t let you be the 
president We’re hdp
Table 6. Main Statistics regarding the values of Cascade Size and Life 
(Cascade Life units are calculated in seconds)
Party
Cascade Size Cascade Life
μ σ Min / Max Total Number μ σ Min / Max Total Time
AKP 6.78 44.63 1/  1,497 9,396 21,695.74 41,903.49 1/ 481489 30,048,596
CHP 8.41 18.54 1/ 323 20,873 19,489.66 36,634.80 1/ 820585 48,353,837
HDP 7.99 20.48 1/ 880 34,015 18,322.89 31,254.70 1/ 329465 77,908,939
MHP 14.42 71.72 1/  2,363 25,547 31,904.73 135,470.39 1/ 2149355 56,503,281
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